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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or
“Commission”) awoke to the reality of powerful computers running
communications networks, and communications networks over which
humans interacted with really powerful computers. Computer services were
a disruptive technology. They were substitute services for traditional
incumbent communication services. They were highly competitive, highly
innovative, and had low barriers to entry. They showed every promise of
playing a vital role in the United States economy. In addition, these
computer network services were dependent upon the underlying
communications network. Thus, the unregulated computer services were
simultaneously substitute services for the traditional regulated
communications networks and also dependent upon them.
Meanwhile, the communication network services were using gigantic
mainframe computers (“big iron”) to run their networks. During network
peaks, mainframe computers were preoccupied with operating the
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networks. During off-peaks, these computers had excess capacity. The
telephone companies knew a good thing when they saw it and wanted to
get into the computer services market, taking advantage, in part, of their
inexpensive excess off-peak mainframe capacity. Thus, the telephone
companies became simultaneously the supplier of the crucial transmission
capacity and a competitor in the computer services market.
The FCC has struggled with the regulatory treatment of computer
networks over communications networks ever since. In 1986, the
Commission stated:
The regulatory issues spawned by the technical confluence of regulated
communications services and unregulated [computer networks] have
been among the most important matters this Commission has dealt
with over the past 20 years. Indeed, during this period, we have
addressed these issues, in one proceeding or another, on a virtually
continuous basis, as we have sought to revise and refine our regulatory
approach in light of rapidly changing technological and marketplace
developments.1

The history of the FCC and the computer networks, particularly the
Internet, is now thirty-five years old. To say that the FCC does not regulate
the Internet is to miss the lessons of this history. While it is true that
computer networks are unregulated, computer networks were very much a
part of the Commission’s policy. They were the intended direct
beneficiaries of the Computer Inquiries. Safeguards were imposed on
common carriers for the benefit of computer networks. In addition, this is
not a history of technologically biased regulation, segregating one
computer from another based on the technology employed. Rather, this is a
market policy, segregating competitive markets from noncompetitive
markets. Finally, the conceptual framework follows a Layered Model of
Regulation. The separate layers permitted, even created, separate markets
(i.e., telephone service, Internet service, application service, and content).
These separate markets created separate regulatory policy.
The Computer Inquiries have been referred to by some as “wildly
successful.”2 They were a necessary precondition for the success of the
Internet.

1. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs. (Third Computer
Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, para. 9, 60 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 603 (1986)
[hereinafter Computer III Report and Order].
2. Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and “Telecommunications Services,” Universal
Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16
YALE J. ON REG. 211, 222 (1999) (“That approach was wildly successful in spurring
innovation and competition in the enhanced-services marketplace: Government maintained
its control of the underlying transport, sold primarily by regulated monopolies, while
eschewing any control over the newfangled, competitive ‘enhancements.’”).
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II. COMPUTER I (1966)
A.

The Setting

1.

A Better Mouse Trap

It is the 1960s. The FCC faces a problem. At this time there exists a
communications network that offers basic communications service. This
communications network is provided by the incumbent monopoly, Ma Bell,
also known as AT&T. This network has been traditionally regulated by the
FCC. It was built in a regulatory environment as a sanctioned monopoly
with ratepayer fees.3
The problem was that someone figured out how to build a better
mouse trap. Someone figured out how to use computers with this network.
Someone figured out how to enhance the network by adding devices at the
ends of the network, layering protocols on top of the network, and
achieving data processing using remote terminals. Ultimately these
innovations would evolve into computer networks. These enhancements
were dependent upon the underlying communications monopoly and came
with the marvelous promise of economic expansion, innovation, and
competition. These enhancements, however, also threatened to be a
substitute for regulated services, and regulated services threatened to be a
bottleneck in the way of the growth of these services.

2.

Western Union

In the 1960s, the FCC’s common carrier authority covered not merely
Ma Bell; Western Union also fell under Title II of the Communications Act
of 1934. The Western Union telegram service was, in retrospect, an
interesting service. The service took an order for a message from a user.
The user provided a destination address and content for the message. The
message then was inserted into the Western Union system. However, if the
message originated in Baltimore for a destination in Los Angeles, it did not
go straight through a wire from Baltimore to Los Angeles. Rather, the
operator in Baltimore, not knowing the full path of the transmission to Los
Angeles, knew instead the next hop in the general direction of Los Angeles,
and forwarded the message to that next hop. At the next hop, which might
have been Chicago, an operator received the telegram, read only the header

3. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Report, 14 F.C.C.R.
2398, para. 45, 14 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1292 (1999).
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with the address, and then forwarded the message back into the network in
the general direction of the destination. In this way, the message worked its
way through the network, being stored and then forwarded, hopping from
node to node in a best effort, until it reached its final destination and was
stored until delivered to the recipient.4
In the 1960s, it dawned on users of mainframe computers that they
could take advantage of the excess capacity of the mainframes to send
messages to each other. Alfred may log onto the mainframe from one
remote terminal, and leave a message for Beth. Beth would then log onto
the mainframe from another remote terminal, perhaps in another state, and
receive the message. Eventually computer message-switching5 became a
commercial service that did not simply store messages on a mainframe, but
transmitted messages through computer networks. Alfred would create a
message and hit send. The message would go to the first e-mail server,
which would read the address, and then send the message on to the next
hop in the network. The next hop would read the address and act
accordingly. When the message reached its destination computer, the
message was stored until accessed by the recipient, Beth.
These two things look very similar to each other. However, one was
regulated; the other was not. One was expensive; the other one was cheap,
and avoided regulatory fees. One is a substitute service for the other.6
There are two things to be taken away from this. First, messageswitching was dependent upon a regulated underlying telephone monopoly
for transmission. Second, unregulated message-switching was a substitute
service for the regulated telegram services of Western Union.7 What
exactly to do with message switching was one of the significant drivers of
the Computer I inquiry.8

4. Delbert D. Smith, The Interdependence of Computer and Communications Services
and Facilities: A Question of Federal Regulation, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1969).
5. See Computer and Comm. Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 203 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (“‘Message-switching’ was defined as ‘[t]he computer-controlled transmission of
messages, between two or more points, via communications facilities, wherein the content
of the message remains unaltered.’”); Reg. and Policy Problems Presented by the
Interdependence of Computer and Comm. Servs., Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291,
para. 15, 18 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1713 (1970) [hereinafter Computer I Tentative Decision].
6. The Author wishes to acknowledge Prof. Dale Hatfield for this point.
7. See Smith, supra note 4, at 831, 836 (recounting historical context of Computer I
actions and issues presented).
8. Id. at 852.
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Big Iron and New Networks

This was a moment of major expansion of the American economy.
Big iron mainframe computing had taken hold and was becoming big
business. Mainframe computing was also evolving with the advent of time
sharing and remote terminal access.9 The role of IBM, computer
manufacturers, and data processing services in the economy had grown and
promised continued growth.10 There were in-house computer services,
computer service bureaus, and specialized computer services such as stock
quotation services.11 Computers were being used to facilitate President
Kennedy’s space race, advance the Cold War, run communications
networks that replaced human operators, and re-create the way business
was conducted.12 The Internet would not be born until the end of the
1960s.13 The United States government responded to the 1950s Soviet
launch of Sputnik with, among other things, the establishment of the
Advanced Research Projects Agency (“ARPA”). ARPA’s computer
research program, headed by individuals such as J.C.R. Licklider and Larry
Roberts, led a team of researchers to develop the ARPANet. On October
25, 1969, ARPANet went online, transmitting its first message between
computers at the University of California at Los Angeles and the Stanford
Research Institute. Originally, the government-run ARPANet used the
Network Control Protocol; it did not migrate to the Internet Protocol (“IP”)
for 14 years. 14

9. Reg. and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Comm. Servs., Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, para. 16, 8 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1567
(1966) [hereinafter Computer I Notice of Inquiry].
10. Pursuant to the 1956 Consent Decree, IBM was prohibited from entering the
computer service bureau market and could only act as a supplier of equipment. Smith, supra
note 4, at 834.
11. Computer I Notice of Inquiry, supra note 9, paras. 3-9; Smith, supra note 4, at 831,
836 (recounting the historical context of Computer I actions and issues presented).
12. Triumph of the Nerds: A History of the Computer: Electronics (1996), at
http://www.pbs.org/nerds/timeline/elec.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2002); Computer History
Museum, Timeline of Computer History, at http://www.computerhistory.org/timeline/
index.page (last visited Nov. 17, 2002).
13. This paper focuses on the Internet as a primary example of the FCC’s Computer
Inquiry policy. The Internet is but one example, perhaps a paradigm, among a multitude of
what would come to be known as enhanced services.
14. Robert X. Cringely, PBS Nerds 2.0.1 Timeline (1998), at http://www.pbs.org/opb/
nerds2.0.1/timeline/; Richard T Griffiths, The Origins and Growth of the Internet and the
World
Wide
Web
(Oct.
2001),
at
http://www.let.leidenuniv.
nl/history/ivh/chap1.htm; Computer History Museum, Internet History and Microprocessor
Timeline
1962-1992,
at
http://computerhistory.org/exhibits/
internet_history (last visited Nov. 17, 2002).
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The Issue

In the 1960s, the FCC faced a problem of something the Commission
referred to as “convergence.”15 There were computers that facilitated the
operation of the communications network and there were computers with
which humans interacted.16 What should the Commission make of these
computers? How should they be treated and how do they fall within the
regulatory scheme? What type of jurisdiction did the FCC have over these
computers and should data processing services be regulated under Title II
of the Communications Act of 1934? Should the FCC be concerned that
some of those regulated communications companies were wandering off
and entering into the unregulated data processing markets, at times using
the excess capacity of their communications network computers to do data
processing? Were the communication networks keeping up with the needs
and the demands of the data processing networks?
Thus, the FCC, in order to resolve these problems, launched in 1966
what came to be known as the Computer I inquiry.17 The task before the
Commission could be boiled down to two issues:
(a) [t]he nature and extent of the regulatory jurisdiction to be applied to
data processing services; and
(b) [w]hether, under what circumstances, and subject to what
conditions or safeguards, common carriers should be permitted to
engage in data processing.18

C.

The Policy

1.

Classification

The year 1970 saw the FCC’s first attempt to divide the world. The
FCC concluded that the appropriate division would be between those
computers that ran the communications network and those computers at the
ends of the telephone lines with which people interacted. The division was
technological, focused on computer processing, attempting to divine the
difference between circuit- or message-switching and data processing.19
15. Computer I Notice of Inquiry, supra note 9, para. 13; see also Second Computer
Inquiry, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, para. 19, 47 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 669 (1980)
[hereinafter Computer II Final Decision] (“The First Computer Inquiry was a vehicle for
identification and better understanding of problems spawned by the confluence of computer
and communications technologies taking place at that time.”).
16. Computer I Notice of Inquiry, supra note 9, paras. 10-16 (discussing the migration
of common carriers to the use of computers to run networks).
17. See generally id.
18. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 5, para. 14.
19. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 17.
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The Commission attempted to divide the world between “pure
communications” and “pure data processing.”20
Pure communications exist where the content of the message is
transmitted over the network transparently with no change in content or
form of the message.21 Pure data processing is the processing that takes
place at the end of the telephone line. It is:
[t]he use of a computer for the processing of information as
distinguished from circuit or message-switching. ‘Processing’ involves
the use of the computer for operations which include, inter alia, the
functions of storing, retrieving, sorting, merging and calculating data,
according to programmed instructions.22

The problem is that there is computer processing in both
communications and data communications. What was the FCC to do with
things that looked like they were a little bit of each? The Commission was
not too sure, so it created a third category known as hybrids.23 This was the
gray area and the FCC declared that it would resolve the classification of
these gray services on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.24 If it was more
communications than not, then it was communications; if it was more data
processing than not, then it was data processing.25 This gray area was the
exception that subsumed the rule and quickly became the undoing of
Computer I.

2.

Regulation

These two categories had very different characteristics that led to
different policy results. This pivotal theme goes throughout the Computer
Inquiries. The Commission made policy decisions about these different
computers based not upon the technology, but upon the markets within
which the technology existed.
20. Computer and Comm. Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
21. Id. at 203 n.6; Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 5, para. 15.
22. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 5, para. 15.
23. Id. (“Hybrid Service—an offering of service which combines Remote Access data
processing and message-switching to form a single integrated service.”).
24. Reg. and Policy Problems presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Comm. Servs., Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, paras. 27, 31-38, 21 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 1591 (1971) [hereinafter Computer I Final Decision]; Computer I Tentative
Decision, supra note 5, paras. 39-45.
25. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs. (Second
Computer Inquiry), Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry and Rulemaking, 72
F.C.C.2d 358, paras. 6-7, 17, 45 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1485 (1979) [hereinafter Computer II
Tentative Decision]; Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, paras. 13-14; Amendment
of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs., Notice of Inquiry and Proposed
Rulemaking, 61 F.C.C.2d 103, paras. 13-14 (1976) [hereinafter Computer II Notice of
Inquiry].
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The pure data processing market was viewed as an innovative,
competitive market with low barriers to entry and little chance of
monopolization. Viewing this market, the FCC concluded that there was no
demonstrated need for regulation or safeguards.26 The FCC became quite
apologetic as Computer I went on, clarifying that it never had any intention
whatsoever at any time of regulating data processing.27
The pure communications market, on the other hand, was provisioned
by an incumbent monopoly. This monopoly almost always was AT&T but
there were a few other players such as GTE and a large handful of small,
mainly rural, incumbent carriers. In any given market, these players
exercised control through their regulated monopoly. Thus, the FCC
articulated four concerns about the incumbent telephone companies:
(a) That the sale of data processing services by carriers should not
adversely affect the provision of efficient and economic common
carrier services;
(b) That the costs related to the furnishing of such data processing
services should not be passed on, directly or indirectly, to the users of
common carrier services;
(c) That revenues derived from common carrier services should not be
used to subsidize any data processing services; and
(d) That the furnishing of such data processing services by carriers
should not inhibit [the competitive computer market].28

The telephone companies were acquiring large computers that helped
run their networks during peak performance times. These computers were
26. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 5, paras. 19-23:
Applying these standards to the record before us we conclude that the offering of
data processing services is essentially competitive and that, except to the limited
extent hereinafter set forth, there is no public interest requirement for regulation
by government of such activities. Thus, there is ample evidence that data
processing services of all kinds are becoming available in larger volume and that
there are no natural or economic barriers to free entry into the market for these
services. The number of data processing bureaus, time sharing systems, and
specialized information services is steadily increasing and there are no indications
that any of these markets are threatened with monopolization.
Id. para. 20. See also Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 127 (reviewing
Computer I history); Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, paras. 16-17
(reviewing Computer I history).
27. The Commission stated:
It should be made clear that we are not seeking to regulate data processing as
such, nor are we attempting to regulate the substance of any carrier’s offerings of
data processing. Rather, we are limiting regulation to requirements respecting the
framework in which a carrier may publicly offer particular non-regulated services,
the nature and characteristics of which require separation before predictable
abuses are given opportunity to arise.
Computer I Final Decision, supra note 24, para. 30.
28. Id. para. 9. See also Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, para. 124
(reviewing history of maximum separation).
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paid for by ratepayers. During the off-peak hours, these computers would
have excess capacity that the telephone companies could use to enter the
data processing market.29 Since these services were paid for with telephone
revenue, this gave the telephone companies the ability to enter the data
processing market at significantly reduced rates.30 Having entered the
market, the carriers would have the incentive and the opportunity for crosssubsidization and other unfair trade practices.31
It was not the design of the FCC to bluntly bar carriers from the
provision of data processing services;32 rather the Commission recognized
certain benefits if safeguards could be designed to permit carriers to enter
into the market.33 Also, the Commission at this time was concerned that the
telephone companies were sufficiently meeting the needs of data
processing and computer services.34 The Computer Inquiries policy had as
its explicit goal the promotion of economic growth and innovation in the

29. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 24, para. 7; Computer I Notice of Inquiry,
supra note 9, para. 10-16.
30. See also Computer II Notice of Inquiry, supra note 25, para. 3:
First, a major regulatory concern of the Commission was the appropriateness of a
carrier utilizing part of its communications switching plant to offer a data
processing service. Further, there was the issue of whether communication
common carriers should be permitted to sell data processing services and, if so,
what safeguards should be imposed to insure that the carriers would not engage in
anti-competitive or discriminatory practices. There was also concern as to the
extent to which data processing organizations should be permitted to sell
communications as part of a data processing package not subject to regulation.
Id.
31. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 24, paras. 21-22; see also Computer II
Notice of Inquiry, supra note 25, para. 5 (“[W]e were concerned about the possibility that
common carriers might favor their own data processing activities by discriminatory services,
cross subsidization, improper pricing of common carrier services, and related
anticompetitive practices and activities which could result in burdening or impairing the
carrier’s provision of its other regulated services.”); Computer I Tentative Decision, supra
note 5, para. 25.
32. See Computer I Final Decision, supra note 24, para. 11 (discussing and rejecting
parties’ views that there should be an outright ban on carrier provision of data processing
services).
33. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 5, paras. 30-33.
34. Computer I Notice of Inquiry, supra note 9, para. 21:
This, then, is another area of concern. Are the service offerings of the common
carriers, as well as their tariffs and practices, keeping pace with the quickened
developments in digital technology? Does a gap exist between computer industry
needs and requirements, on the one side, and communications technology and
tariff rates and practices on the other?
Id. See also Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 5, paras. 6-11 (resolving the issue of
whether common carrier offerings are meeting the needs of the computer industry);
Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 14; Computer II Tentative Decision, supra
note 25, para. 2.
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computer services market.35 The Commission recognized the dependency
of the computer networks on the underlying communications facility:
There is virtually unanimous agreement by all who have commented in
response to our Inquiry, as well as by all those who have contributed to
the rapidly expanding professional literature in the field, that the data
processing industry has become a major force in the American
economy, and that its importance to the economy will increase in both
absolute and relative terms in the years ahead. There is similar
agreement that there is a close and intimate relationship between data
processing and communications services and that this interdependence
will continue to increase. In fact, it is clear that data processing cannot
survive, much less develop further, except through reliance upon and
use of communication facilities and services.36

The communications facility was a crucial resource upon which they
depended, supplied by a single provider who also had the potential to be a
competitor.
Telephone companies had both the ability and the incentive to act in
an anticompetitive manner.37 They sat in an unusual place in the market of
being both supplier and competitor to the data processing services.38 The
Commission expressed misgivings about whether permitting telephone
companies to enter the data processing market was prudent, questioning

35. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, para. 59.
36. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 24, para. 7; see also Computer I Notice of
Inquiry, supra note 9, para. 1 (“Effective use of the computer is, therefore, becoming
increasingly dependent upon communication common carrier facilities and services by
which the computers and the user are given instantaneous access to each other.”).
37. In 1987, the Federal District Court for Washington, D.C. stated:
That the ability for abuse exists as does the incentive, of that there can also be no
doubt. As stated above, information services are fragile, and because of their
fragility, time-sensitivity, and their negative reactions to even small degradations
in transmission quality and speed, they are most easily subject to destruction by
those who control their transmission. Among the more obvious means of
anticompetitive action in this regard are increases in the rates for those switched
and private line services upon which Regional Company competitors depend
while lower rates are maintained for Regional Company network services;
manipulation of the quality of access lines; impairment of the speed, quality, and
efficiency of dedicated private lines used by competitors; development of new
information services to take advantage of planned, but not yet publicly known,
changes in the underlying network; and use for Regional Company benefit of the
knowledge of the design, nature, geographic coverage, and traffic patterns of
competitive information service providers.
United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 566 (D.D.C. 1987).
38. Computer I Notice of Inquiry, supra note 9, para. 15 (“As a consequence, common
carriers, in offering these services, are, or will be, in many instances, competitive with
services sold by computer manufacturers and service bureau firms. At the same time, such
firms will be dependent upon common carriers for reasonably priced communication
facilities and services.”).
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whether telephone companies should be permitted into this market at all.39
If they were so permitted, then the question was on what terms and with
what safeguards?40

3.

Safeguard: Maximum Separation

In response to the concerns related to the communications facility, the
Commission devised its “Maximum Separation” safeguards.41 Maximum
Separation meant that regulated communications carriers could enter the
unregulated data processing market, but only through a fully separate
subsidiary.42 The FCC required that a carrier establish a separate data
processing corporation, have separate accounting books, have separate
officers, have separate personnel, and have separate equipment and
facilities.43 The carrier was also prohibited from promoting the data
processing services offered by the separate subsidiary.44 The carrier could
not use its network computers for non-network purposes; the carrier could
not use the excess capacity of the network computers during off-peak times
to provision data processing services.45 Finally, the affiliated subsidiary
39. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, para. 15.
40. Id. para. 3.
41. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 24, para. 10; Computer I Tentative Decision,
supra note 5, paras. 34-35:
Because of the increasing involvement of interstate communications facilities and
services in the provision of data transmission, the need for such separation is
apparent and urgent. This need exists whether or not at the present time the carrier
is engaged in the sale of local or remote access data processing. In either instance,
there is a potential for abuse in the form of a commingling of costs associated with
the rendition of communication and data processing services, which can give rise
to the above-discussed problems of cross-subsidization and other unfair
competitive practices in the pricing of regulated and nonregulated services. Also,
such commingling of operations and related costs will unduly complicate the task
of effective regulation of the communication rates and services of common
carriers. It will tend to obscure, if not defeat, the ready identification and
allocation for accounting and ratemaking purposes of the costs associated with
each activity.
Id. para. 35. See Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 18; Computer II Tentative
Decision, supra note 25, paras. 4, 123.
42. See Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 5, paras. 36-38.
43. See id. para. 36.
44. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 24, paras. 18, 21: “[W]e have decided to
modify our rules to prohibit a data affiliate from using the name of its related common
carrier in its promotions and, further, to prohibit such affiliate from using, in its corporate
name, any words or symbols contained in the name of its affiliated carrier.” Id. para. 18.
45. Id. paras. 13-15, 24. Carriers could use their own computers to meet their own data
processing needs and the needs of independent telephone companies, so long as those needs
were incidental to the provision of communications services. Id. para. 40. The carrier was
otherwise, however, prohibited from acquiring the services of its data processing affiliate.
Id. para. 20.
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was not itself permitted to own transmission services but had to acquire all
such services on a tariff basis.46
There is a bit of a curiosity however about to whom this obligation
would apply. Maximum Separation applied only to those carriers with
annual operating revenues exceeding $1,000,000.47 It appears that perhaps
the only carriers that surpassed the threshold might be AT&T and GTE.
AT&T, however, had other problems. The U.S. Department of Justice
initiated an antitrust proceeding against AT&T in 1956, the settlement of
which prohibited AT&T from offering unregulated services.48 By declaring
data processing to be unregulated, the FCC may also have been declaring
that AT&T was barred from providing such services.49

46. See Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 229.
47. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 24, para. 23. See Computer I Tentative
Decision, supra note 5, para. 36.
48. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), vacated sub nom. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 2
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1388 (D.D.C. 1996). See Accounting Safeguards Under the
Telecomms. Act of 1996, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 17539, para. 3 n.5, 5 Comm. Reg.
(P & F) 861 (1996) [hereinafter Accounting Safeguards].
The Modified Final Judgment (“MFJ”) originally prohibited the BOCs from
providing information services, providing interLATA services, or manufacturing
and selling telecommunications equipment or manufacturing customer premises
equipment. The theory behind this prohibition in the MFJ was that the BOCs
could leverage their market power in the local market to impede competition in
the interLATA services, manufacturing, and information services markets. The
information services restriction was modified in 1987 to allow BOCs to provide
voice messaging services and to transmit information services generated by
others.
Id. (internal citations omitted); Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 5, para. 24
(stating AT&T “cannot furnish data processing services”). Cf. Computer II Final Decision,
supra note 15, paras. 277-81 (suggesting that it was not clear what AT&T was and was not
permitted to do with regard to enhanced services and customer-premises equipment
(“CPE”)); Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, paras. 135-48 (noting that AT&T
was foreclosed from offering data processing services under Computer I, but further
concluding that AT&T would be permitted into the CPE and enhanced services market).
49. See Ann E. Rendahl, California v. FCC: A Victory for the States, 13 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 233, 238-39 (1991):
The FCC determined that it was only necessary to apply this maximum separation
policy to common carriers earning over one million dollars a year, but only the
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T) fell into this category. However,
such line drawing was irrelevant since AT&T and the Bell Operating Companies
(BOCs) were already prohibited from providing competitive, non-common carrier
services under a 1956 consent decree . . . .
Id. at 239. See also Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs.
(Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, paras. 24-26, 60 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 603 (1986) [hereinafter Computer III Report and Order] (describing debate
concerning whether AT&T would be permitted into the “information services” market).
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Legacy of Computer I

What is the legacy of Computer I? The first principles laid down in
Computer I are consistently followed throughout the entire proceeding.
How these first principles are applied and the outcome that is produced
may be different, but the Computer Inquiries are consistently concerned
about markets. The data processing market is highly competitive and
innovative and demonstrates no need for regulation. The data processing
market, however, is dependent upon the communications market. The
communications companies are both a bottleneck supplier of services and a
competitor in the data processing market. Therefore, strict safeguards were
put into place in order to restrain the market power of the communications
company and for the benefit of the data processing market. These are
border regulations between markets where the divisions between the
markets can easily be discerned and maintained. These safeguards create an
open communications platform available to all users on a
nondiscriminatory basis.
There is another important point. Contrary to popular
mischaracterization, this is not a history of regulatory restraint. This is not a
history of the FCC “not regulating the Internet.”50 Rather, this is a history
of the FCC taking affirmative and aggressive regulation of communications
networks, specifically for the benefit of the computer networks. The
computer networks were clearly the designated beneficiaries of the
safeguards.
Finally, the problems addressed by the Commission in the 1960s are
parallel to the issues today. It was called “convergence” back then just like
today. The “new service” was a substitute for the old service. The new
service was unregulated where the old service was entrenched and
50. Compare JASON OXMAN, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET
(Office of Plans and Policy, Federal Communications Commission, Working Paper No. 31,
1999)
available
at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf
(reviewing FCC precedent from the perspective of how the FCC elected not to regulate
information services). See also Press Release, Federal Communications Commission,
Internet Prospers With “Hands-Off Unregulation;” FCC Paper Rejects Need For Precipitous
Action (July 19, 1999) available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/News_Releases/
1999/nrop9004.html (stating “the paper examines the FCC’s thirty-year history of not
regulating the data services market, and how that tradition of ‘unregulation’ was a crucial
factor in the successful growth of the Internet”); FCC, CONNECTING THE GLOBE, A
REGULATOR’S GUIDE TO BUILDING A GLOBAL INFORMATION COMMUNITY IX-3 (1999),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/connectglobe/ (stating “[t]he Internet has evolved at an
unprecedented pace, in large part due to the absence of government regulation”); FCC
Chairman William E. Kennard, Address before the Federal Communications Bar Northern
California Chapter, San Francisco, CA, “The Unregulation of the Internet: Laying a
Competitive Course for the Future” (July 20, 1999) (transcription available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/spwek924.html).
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regulated. The new service was dependent upon the underlying old service.
The old service sought to enter the market of the new service. The old
service market was highly consolidated (well, OK, it was a monopoly
then). These are similar to today’s issues.

III. COMPUTER II (1976)
A.

The Setting

The ink had not dried on the Computer I before it had become clear
that it had problems. The FCC was inundated with applications concerning
hybrid services and forced to make a case-by-case analysis of where these
services might fall.51 Computer processing was involved in both “pure
communications” and “data processing.”52
In the meantime, a curious thing had happened. The relatively dumb
terminals that had been used to communicate with the mainframe
computers had become smart. The cost of computer processing units
(“CPUs”) was dropping dramatically. Computer chips were showing up in
places other than IBM big iron. Suddenly, microcomputers made their
appearance, there was intelligence at both ends of the line, and distributed
computing had been born.53 The Commission took note of the introduction
of packet-switched networks such as Telenet.54 AT&T was building
customer premise equipment—telephones—with which one could enter

51. See Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, para. 86 (“We recognize the
inadequacy of the hybrid service definitions in the existing rule.”); Computer III Report and
Order, supra note 49, para. 10 (“After Computer I took effect, technological and
competitive developments in the telecommunications and computer industries exposed
shortcomings in its definitional structure, and in particular its ad hoc approach to evaluating
the ‘hybrid’ category.”).
52. Amendments of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs. (Computer
Inquiry), Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Enlargement of Proposed Rulemaking, 64
F.C.C.2d 771, para. 8 (1977) [hereinafter Computer II Supplemental Notice of Inquiry].
53. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, paras. 19, 23. See also Computer II
Tentative Decision, supra note 25, paras. 8-11; Computer II Supplemental Notice of Inquiry,
supra note 52, paras. 3-7; Computer II Notice of Inquiry, supra note 25, paras. 8-10.
54. Computer II Notice of Inquiry, supra note 25, paras. 10, 12 (describing packet
switching networks as “radically new”).
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and manipulate text—word processors.55 IBM showed no hesitation in
demonstrating its displeasure about AT&T’s entrance into its market.
The stage was set. Computer I would have to be scrapped; Computer
II was initiated in 1976.56 Meanwhile the Internet continued in its
childhood. In 1972, the nation saw the first public demonstration of
ARPANet. The InterNetworking Working Group was convened in 1972.57
Bob Metcalfe completed his Ph.D. thesis in 1973 on the Ethernet. Vint Cerf
and Bob Kahn presented a paper in 1974 on the Internet Protocol.58 In
1983, the U.S. government declared that ARPANet would migrate from the
Network Control Protocol to the Internet Protocol TCP/IP.59

B.

The Issue

The FCC returned to square one. How should it classify these
different sets of computers? The hybrid middle ground had been a source
of aggravation. Dumb remote terminals had given way to smart
microcomputers or minicomputers.60 The concept of interactive computers
as something that one accesses with remote terminals over the
communications network, with all processing taking place at the
mainframe, was vanishing. The classifications of pure communications and
pure data processing were unsustainable. Now the FCC faced interactive
computers forming logical networks overlaying physical networks. The
Commission understatedly described its new situation as “more
complicated.”61
Furthermore, the rigid safeguards of “maximum separation” were
called into question. Was it really necessary for a small incumbent
telephone company in the foothills of the Appalachian Mountains, with less

55. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, paras. 19, 23. See also Computer II
Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, supra note 52, para. 4 (“In our new Computer Inquiry, we
noted that peripheral devices are now capable of duplicating many of the data-manipulative
capabilities which were previously available only at centralized locations housing large
scale general purpose computers.”); Computer II Notice of Inquiry, supra note 25, para. 10
(noting the ability of network processing, as opposed to CPE, to achieve call forwarding,
abbreviated dialing, and other functionality that would come to be incorporated into the
public telephone network switches).
56. Computer II Notice of Inquiry, supra note 25.
57. Cringely, supra note 14; Computer History Museum, supra note 14.
58. Cringely, supra note 14.
59. Id.; Computer History Museum, supra note 14.
60. Computer II Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, supra note 52, para. 7 (“The new
technology may also have rendered meaningless any real distinction between ‘terminals’
and computers.”).
61. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 83.
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than 1000 subscribers, to set up a separate corporation simply to offer data
processing services?

C.

The Resolution

1.

Basic versus Enhanced Service Dichotomy

Out of the analytical turmoil over classification of these services was
born the basic versus enhanced services dichotomy. This established a
division between “common carrier transmission services from those
computer services which depend on common carrier services in the
transmission of information.”62 It established a transformation in the
conceptual framework, migrating from attempts to determine differences
between technologies to an examination of differences between services
experienced by edge users. This came to be the foundation of the FCC’s
Computer Inquiries.

a.

Basic Services

“Basic service is the offering of ‘a pure transmission capability over a
communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction
with customer supplied information.’”63 It is the transmission capacity in
the physical network for the movement of information.64 The basic service
is limited to this transmission capacity65 and does not interact with user
supplied information. Computer processing, including protocol conversion,
security, and memory storage, provisioned in the network for the benefit of
the network, and not for the edge user, is a part of the basic service.66 In

62. Id. para. 86.
63. Computer and Comm. Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 205 n.18 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 96.
64. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 93.
65. Id. para. 95.
66. See Independent Data Comm. Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,
10 F.C.C.R. 13717, para. 11, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 409 (1995) [hereinafter Frame Relay
Order] (“The use of packet switching and error control techniques ‘that facilitate the
economical, reliable movement of [such] information [do] not alter the nature of the basic
service.’”); Computer III Report and Order, supra note 49, para. 10 (“Data processing,
computer memory or storage, and switching techniques can be components of a basic
service if they are used solely to facilitate the movement of information.”); Computer II
Final Decision, supra note 15, paras. 95, 98:
Use internal to the carrier’s facility of companding techniques, bandwidth
compression techniques, circuit switching, message or packet switching, error
control techniques, etc. that facilitate economical, reliable movement of
information does not alter the nature of the basic service. In the provision of a
basic transmission service, memory or storage within the network is used only to
facilitate the transmission of the information from the origination to its
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other words, processing used “solely to facilitate the movement of
information” is a part of the basic service.67
[T]he generic characteristic of the communications function is that the
semantic content of information is not changed at the completion of a
given process. A message entering a network is intended to arrive at its
destination unchanged. Several computer operations, such as message
and circuit switching, may be required to permit the message to transit
the network. In this process, individual symbols may be processed, as
in code conversion and error correction. Or the message may be
accompanied by addressing information, such as dial pulses or
message headers, which are used by the communications network for
centralized message routing. The purpose of these computer operations
is, nevertheless, the transmission of an unaltered message through a
network and they do not constitute a data processing service.68

Note that what is not a part of the definition of the basic service is the
telephony application; basic service is the provisioned transmission service
“regardless of whether subscribers use it for voice, data, video, facsimile,
or other forms of transmission.”69
The Commission wanted to ensure that carriers were able to use
computers within their networks,70 so it sought “the stimulation of
economic activity in the regulated communications sector by removing
ambiguities in the existing definitions.”71 By the creation of the basic
versus enhanced dichotomy, the Commission sought to create regulatory
certainty, permitting carriers to use computers in association with the basic
service without fear that such use would be considered enhanced. If the
service were enhanced, either AT&T may not be able to offer the
unregulated service, or the carrier could offer the service but only through a

destination, and the carrier’s basic transmission network is not used as an
information storage system. Thus, in a basic service, once information is given to
the communication facility, its progress towards the destination is subject to only
those delays caused by congestion within the network or transmission priorities
given by the originator.
Id. para. 95.
67. Computer III Report and Order, supra note 49, para. 10.
68. Computer II Notice of Inquiry, supra note 25, para. 18.
69. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 94 (thus we see the initial
uncoupling of the telephony application from the transmission facility).
70. Id. para. 97. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, para. 12 (“It was stated
that by defining data processing positively a carrier would be able to use computers for any
purpose which is not data processing.”); Computer II Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, supra
note 52, para. 10.
71. Computer II Notice of Inquiry, supra note 25, para. 16.
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separate subsidiary.72 Thus, the Commission concluded that computer
processing that “relates to and is for the purpose of providing a
communications service or meeting its own in-house needs” is a basic
service and may be provisioned freely by the carrier.73
In its tentative decision, the Commission proposed that there would
be three categories: voice, basic non-voice, and enhanced non-voice
services. Both voice and basic non-voice fell within what is now known as
basic services. Voice was “the electronic transmission of the human voice
such that one human being can orally converse with another human
being.”74 Basic non-voice was an intriguing formulation. It was:
[T]he transmission of subscriber inputted information or data where
the carrier: (a) electronically converts originating messages to signals
which are compatible with a transmission medium, (b) routes these
signals through the network to the appropriate destination, (c)
maintains signal integrity in the presence of noise and other
impairments to transmission, (d) corrects transmission errors, and (e)
converts the electrical signals to usable form at the destination.75

This formulation is noteworthy because it describes the behavior of such
things as TCP/IP. Had this formulation been accepted, the regulatory status
of the Internet might have been quite different. But the basic non-voice
category along with the division of basic service into two parts was
rejected.
As with pure communications, basic services are regulated under Title
II under the same rationale, with the same concerns for discrimination and
anticompetitive behavior.76 Computers associated with basic service could
be used for the provision of basic service alone.77

b.

Enhanced Services

After considerable consideration and reformation, enhanced services
was defined as:
[S]ervices, offered over common carrier transmission facilities used in
interstate communications, which employ computer processing
applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar

72. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, paras. 70-71. “[C]omputer
processing applications employed within a carrier’s network in conjunction with ‘voice’ and
‘basic non-voice’ services can be performed without restriction on the use of data
processing applications utilized within the framework of these two services.” Id. para. 70.
73. Id. para. 87.
74. Id. para. 69.
75. Id.
76. Id. para. 125 (“The objectives of the maximum separation policy are still valid
today.”).
77. Id. para. 71.
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aspects of the subscriber’s transmitted information; provide the
subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or involve
subscriber interaction with stored information.78

This generally means that what goes into the network is different than what
comes out of the network.
The simplicity of this definition belies the turmoil that was
experienced in developing it. Originally the FCC simply envisioned a
reformation of the Computer I definitions.79 The types of activity covered
by “data processing” were anticipated to be such things as word processing,
arithmetic processing, and process control.80 But the Commission was
uncomfortable with the way that the old definition left too much to the
hybrid category. Pointing to processing was insufficient as processing
could be utilized by either communications or data processing. The
Commission therefore transformed the concept so that, instead of trying to
segregate processing capabilities, it instead would make the classification
dependent on the nature of the activity involved.81 This transforms the
analysis from an examination of the technology to an examination of the
service provisioned.82
78. Miscellaneous Rules Relating to Common Carriers, 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2002).
79. The definition was originally proposed as a reformation of “data processing.” In the
1976 Supplemental Notice, the definition of data processing proposed was as follows:
“‘Data processing’ is the electronically automated processing of information wherein: (a)
the information content, or meaning, of the input information is in any way transformed, or
(b) where the output information constitutes a programmed response to input information.”
Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, para. 12 (citations omitted).
80. Id. para. 13; Computer II Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, supra note 52, para. 9;
Computer II Notice of Inquiry, supra note 25, paras. 17-18.
81. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 131 (“We have tried to draw the
line in a manner which distinguishes wholly traditional common carrier activities, regulable
under Title II of the Act, from historically and functionally competitive activities not
congruent with the Act’s traditional forms.”); Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note
25, para. 15 (“Under the new definition the determination as to whether a communications
or data processing service is being offered would depend on the nature of the processing
activity involved.”).
82. According to the Commission:
Based on this record, the mandate of this Commission in a rapidly changing
technological environment, the market developments resulting from the
confluence of technologies, the impossibility of defining at the enhanced level a
clear and stable point at which “communications” becomes “data processing,” the
ever increasing dependence upon common carrier transmission facilities in the
movement of information, the need to tailor services to individual user
requirements, and the potential for unwarranted expansion of regulation, we
conclude that the public interest would not be served by any classification scheme
that attempts to distinguish enhanced services based on the communications or
data processing nature of the computer processing activity performed.
Accordingly, we conclude that all enhanced computer services should be accorded
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The basic versus enhanced dichotomy was designed as a bright-line
test,83 eliminating the “hybrid” middle ground84 and case-by-case review.85
Enhanced services are anything86 more than87 the transmission capacity88 of
basic service. The Commission has articulated a three-prong test for
enhanced services. It “employs computer processing applications that: (1)
act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of a
subscriber’s transmitted information; (2) provide the subscriber additional,
different, or restructured information; or (3) involve subscriber interaction
with stored information.”89 Enhanced services do not facilitate the basic
service; they alter the fundamental character of the basic service (instead,
while the basic service remains the same, the enhanced service is layered
on top, creating a new service for the edge user).90 Anything that takes the
basic service and uses computer processing to alter that service is
enhanced. The image the Commission has at this time is of enhanced
the same regulatory treatment and that no regulatory scheme could be adopted
which would rationally distinguish and classify enhanced services as either
communications or data processing.
Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 113. See Computer II Tentative Decision,
supra note 25, paras. 61-63, 68, 78 (“The regulatory focus should be upon the service being
offered and not merely upon performance of a message switching function.”).
83. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 97 (“[T]he regulatory demarcation
between basic and enhanced services becomes relatively clear-cut.”).
84. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, paras. 15, 87; Computer II
Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, supra note 52, para. 14.
85. Computer and Comm. Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
86. Id. at 205 (“Enhanced service is any service other than basic service.”) (emphasis
added).
87. See, e.g., Establishment of a Funding Mechanism for Interstate Operator Servs. for
the Deaf, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 6808, para. 16, 2 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 744 (1996) [hereinafter Section 255 Order]; Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., Offer of Comparably
Efficient Interconnection to Providers of Video Dialtone-Related Enhanced Servs., Order,
11 F.C.C.R. 985, para. 2 n.5 (1995) (“‘Enhanced services’ use the telephone network to
deliver unregulated services that provide more than a basic voice transmission offering.”)
(emphasis added); Bell Operating Cos.’ Joint Petition for Waiver of Computer II Rules,
Memorandum Order and Opinion, 10 F.C.C.R. 1724, para. 1 n.3 , 76 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)
1536 (1995) [hereinafter BOC’s Joint Petition]; Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note
25, para. 69. (“An ‘enhanced non-voice service’ is any non-voice service which is more than
the ‘basic’ service, where computer processing applications are used to act on the form,
content, code, protocol, etc., of the inputted information.”).
88. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 95 (stating “we believe that a
basic transmission service should be limited to the offering of transmission capacity
between two or more points suitable for a user’s transmission needs”).
89. Section 255 Order, supra note 87, para. 16.
90. Id. Compare with Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, para. 77 (“Of the
three categories of services that we have established—‘voice,’ ‘basic non-voice,’ and
‘enhanced non-voice’—‘voice’ and ‘basic non-voice’ services may employ any computer
processing applications as long as they do not change the nature of the service.”
(punctuation altered)).
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service providers (“ESPs”) acquiring basic services, adding enhanced
services, and then selling the bundled service to consumers on a resale
basis.91
The Commission affirmed its Computer I finding that enhanced
services should be unregulated on the grounds that the market was
competitive.92 The Commission has found that e-mail,93 voice mail,94 the
World Wide Web,95 newsgroups,96 fax store-and-forward, interactive voice
response, gateway, audiotext information services, and protocol
processing97 are enhanced services.
Internet access service takes the basic transmission capacity and
transforms it for the benefit of the edge users. An Internet user and an
Internet service provider (“ISP”) take transmission capacity and add to it in
order to enable Internet access. The physical network speaks analog dial
tone. The equipment at the edge of the logical network speaks IP.
Therefore, the language of the basic service is transformed into a language
that the edge users speak. It is the edge computers, and not the transmission
capacity, that adds Internet packets (user-supplied information). Those
Internet packets are not a necessary component of the basic service; the
basic service is already complete and does not need the packets in order to
be successful.

91. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, para. 73.
92. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, paras. 7, 127-132. “The market is truly
competitive. Experience gained from the competitive evolution of varied market
applications of computer technology offered since the First Computer Inquiry compels us to
conclude that regulation of enhanced services is simply unwarranted.” Id. para. 128.
Computer and Comm. Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Policy and
Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R.
7418, para. 3, 23 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 641 (2001) [hereinafter CPE Order] (describing
market as truly competitive); Access Charge Reform, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Third
Report and Order, and Notice of Inquiry, 11 F.C.C.R. 21354, para. 285, 5 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 604 (1996) (“The Internet access market is also highly competitive and dynamic, with
over 2,000 companies offering Internet access as of mid-1996.”).
93. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Serv., Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R.
11501, para. 78, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1312 (1998) [hereinafter Stevens Report].
94. CPE Order, supra note 92, para. 2.
95. See Stevens Report, supra note 93, para. 76.
96. Id. para. 77.
97. CPE Order, supra note 92, para. 2; 1998 Biennial Reg. Review—Review of
Customer Premises Equip. and Enhanced Servs. Unbundling Rules in the Interexchange,
Exch. Access and Local Exch. Mkts., Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R.
21531, para. 1 n.2 (1998) [hereinafter CPE Further Notice].
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c.

Adjunct Services
A challenge for the Commission was what to do with adjunct
services. Adjunct services “facilitate the use of traditional telephone service
but do not alter the fundamental character of telephone service.”98 The FCC
concluded that adjunct services would “be regulated in the same fashion as
the underlying service—whether basic or enhanced—with which it is
associated in a particular offering.”99 Note that it is never the other way
around—the underlying service does not take on the classification of the
adjunct service. The existence of the adjunct service does not alter the
regulatory classification of the underlying service.100
Some examples follow: directory assistance provides a telephone
number in order to facilitate the use of the basic telephone network.
Therefore, directory assistance takes on the characteristic of the basic
service (it does not transform the basic service into an enhanced service).101
Reverse directory assistance provides a name or an address that is used for
something other than the basic telephone service. Because it does not
facilitate the use of the network, it is not an adjunct to the network.102
Services that facilitate use of the basic service by individuals with
disabilities are also basic services.103

d.

Protocol Processing

The Commission was confronted with how to deal with protocol
processing. As much as the Commission strove to eliminate the middle
ground of “hybrid” services, protocol processing remained a gray area. The
Commission conceded that protocol processing could be either basic or
enhanced. It set forth a straightforward analysis in order to determine in
which category such processing should fall. This analysis is the same as
determining whether an adjunct service is a basic service. Generally,
protocol conversion services are enhanced services.104 Traditionally,
however, three things were considered basic:
[P]rotocol processing: 1) involving communications between an end
user and the network itself (e.g., for initiation, routing, and termination
of calls) rather than between or among users; 2) in connection with the

98. US West Comm., Inc., Petition for Computer III Waiver, Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 1195,
para. 2 n.5, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1261 (1995) [hereinafter US West Petition].
99. Computer III Report and Order, supra note 49, para. 7.
100. US West Petition, supra note 98, para. 2 n.5.
101. Section 255 Order, supra note 87, paras. 17-18.
102. US West Petition, supra note 98, para. 26.
103. Section 255 Order, supra note 87, paras. 17-18.
104. Computer III Report and Order, supra note 49, paras. 20-23; Computer II Final
Decision supra note 15, para. 99; Frame Relay Order, supra note 66, paras. 17-18.

CANNON FINAL

190

3/5/2003 11:12 AM

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55

introduction of a new basic network technology (which requires
protocol conversion to maintain compatibility with existing CPE); and
3) involving internetworking (conversions taking place solely within
the carrier’s network to facilitate provision of a basic network service,
that result in no net conversion to the end user).105

As with the adjunct services analysis, where protocol conversion is for the
benefit and facilitation of the network as opposed to the edge user, it is a
basic service.
The Commission concluded that the simple involvement of packetswitching is not sufficient to conclude that a service is enhanced. AT&T
came up with a peculiar resolution with its Interspan service. With this
offering, AT&T provisioned a packet-switched frame relay service over a
high-speed106 connection, bundling it with enhanced services, and
attempted to sell it as a single indivisible service. The Independent Data
Communications Manufacturers Association challenged the provisioning,
arguing that under Computer II, AT&T had to unbundle the basic from the
enhanced service and offer the basic service to other enhanced service
providers. This time, however, the basic service was the AT&T packetswitched frame relay service.
AT&T argued that the Interspan offering as a whole was an
information service. In the alternative, AT&T argued that contamination
theory meant that the provisioning of the information service indicated that
the whole offering was an information service.
The Commission rejected this argument. The frame relay service
“provides transport of customer data ‘transparently’ across the AT&T
frame relay network.”107 Regardless of whether the service provisioned to
the customer comes as an information service, AT&T was required to
unbundle the basic from the enhanced service.108 The Commission noted
that it has never applied the contamination theory109 to facility-based
providers.110

105. Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the
Comm. Act of 1934, as Amended, Order on Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 2297, para. 2, 6
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 972 (1997) [hereinafter Non-Accounting Safeguards Order on
Reconsideration]. See also Frame Relay Order, supra note 66, paras. 14-16.
106. Frame Relay Order, supra note 66, para. 6.
107. Id. para. 40.
108. Id. para. 41.
109. Contamination theory is the argument that when an enhanced service provider
acquires telecommunications services, combines it with enhanced services, and then sells to
consumers, the enhanced service “contaminates” the basic service, making the service as a
whole an enhanced service. The enhanced service provider, by “reselling”
telecommunications service, does not thereby become a carrier. Id. para. 18.
110. Id. paras. 42-45.
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What do we take away from these decisions? Many things. AT&T
frame relay confirmed that the Commission in Computer II intended to
open up the communications facility over which enhanced services could
be provisioned, regardless of the nature of the basic service. The basic
service can be packet-switched and it need not involve telephony. It can be
broadband and digital. AT&T’s Interspan offering was a far cry from
POTS;111 Computer II still applied.
The protocol processing issue has an odd history. Originally, the
carriers wanted the protocol processing to be categorized as basic services.
At that time, the Bell operating companies (“BOCs”) either were not
permitted to offer unregulated service pursuant to the Modified Final
Judgment, or they were permitted, but only through a separate subsidiary.
Thus, unless protocol conversion was basic, they could not offer it.112 By
Computer III, carriers such as AT&T wanted protocol conversion to be
categorized as enhanced services. Those services, which they were then
permitted to offer, would not fall under Title II regulation.

e. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and “Information
Services”
While the year 1996 brought the Telecommunications Act with its
new terminology including “telecommunications,” “telecommunications
service,” and “information service,” it did not use the terms “basic” or
“enhanced services.” The Commission concluded113 that Congress codified
the basic versus enhanced dichotomy using the new terms of
“telecommunications” and “information services.”114 The FCC concluded
that all enhanced services are information services, although not all
information services are necessarily enhanced services. The explanation for
this conclusion is rooted in the physical network. Enhanced services are
111. POTS, a basic term in the communications field, means “plain old telephone
service.”
112. Computer III Report and Order, supra note 49, paras. 33-35.
113. CPE Order, supra note 92, para. 2 n.6. (“The Commission has concluded that
Congress sought to maintain the basic/enhanced distinction in its definition of
‘telecommunications services’ and ‘information services,’ and that ‘enhanced services’ and
‘information services’ should be interpreted to extend to the same functions.”); CPE Further
Notice, supra note 97, para. 1 n.2.
114. According to the Telecommunications Act of 1996:
The term “information service” means the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing,
but does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control,
or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a
telecommunications service.
47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000).
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provisioned over common carriers; information services are provisioned
over telecommunications (not necessarily telecommunications services).
While some entities that provision telecommunications are
telecommunications services (“common carriers”), not all are. Otherwise,
the Commission concluded that the term “information services” should be
“interpreted to extend to the same functions” and understood in a consistent
manner of enhanced services.115

2.

Safeguards

a.

Maximum Separation to Structural Separation

The problem of the bottleneck communications facility remained
present on the Commission’s mind:
The importance of the control of local facilities, as well as their
location and number, cannot be overstate[d]. As we evolve into more
of an information society, the access/bottleneck nature of the telephone
local loop will take on greater significance. Although technological
trends suggest that hard-wire access provided by a telephone company
will not be the only alternative, its existing ubiquity and the amount of
underlying investment suggest that whatever changes do occur will be
implemented gradually.116

The Commission continued to be concerned that communications services
adequately met the needs of computer processing technology.117 The
Commission affirmed its recognition of the value to individuals and in the
economy of these new innovative services.118 It also affirmed its concern
that the communications facility be maintained as an open platform
available to all and that cross-subsidization be prevented.119
However, the Commission’s theme concerning the inefficiency of
structural separation began to grow. The Commission developed the
opinion that it was not necessary to impose structural separation on all
carriers, but only on those with sufficient market size to be able to abuse
their position. Those carriers with insufficient size and market position do

115. CPE Order, supra note 92, para. 2 n.6; see also CPE Further Notice, supra note 97,
para. 1 n.2; Non-Accounting Safeguards Order on Reconsideration, supra note 105;
Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced
Servs., Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, para. 40 (1998).
116. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 219.
117. Id. paras. 100-01; Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, para. 66 (“A
regulatory structure must be established which adequately addresses present and foreseeable
market applications of computer processing technology.”).
118. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, para. 66.
119. Id. paras. 71-73 (seeking to “insure the availability of transparent common carrier
transmission facilities to all on an equal basis.”).
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not have the same incentives and thus do not require the same level of
safeguards:
Moreover the monopoly rent that a company can extract from such
bottleneck facilities is likely to bear some relation to the number of
subscribers served. It is probable that many of the new information
services that will be offered over telephone lines will incur
developmental expenses that will require large customer bases. As we
observed, many of them are likely to be national in scope. A telephone
company serving a relatively small proportion of the nation’s homes
and businesses is perhaps less likely to pursue such activities
independently. For the most part, long-term profitable entry into the
enhanced services field will probably require penetration of the market
on a national scale, and it is unlikely that such a national operation
could be effectively subsidized from a small pool of monopoly
revenues, or that it could gain any significant competitive advantage by
restricting the access of its competitors to a very limited network of
underlying facilities. The effectiveness of other regulatory tools
available to this Commission and other authorities is also considerably
improved when they are applied to smaller telephone carriers.120

Therefore structural safeguards requiring separate subsidiaries,
formerly known as maximum separation, continued to be applied only to
the large carriers: AT&T and GTE.121 Other carriers merely had to comply
with the unbundling rules discussed infra.122 In 1984, AT&T begot the
BOCs and the BOCs found themselves under the structural separation of
Computer II.123 The Computer II structural separation safeguards were
consistent with Computer I’s maximum separation, requiring a high degree
of separation, independence, and visibility.124

b.

Unbundling

Smaller carriers, as stated infra, lacked the resources from the
regulated side with which to subsidize their unregulated side. They had
fewer customers and less ability to discriminate, turning away paying

120. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 219.
121. Computer III Report and Order, supra note 49, para. 14 (AT&T established AT&T
Information Systems, Inc. as its separate subsidiary). See also Amendment of Section
64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs. (Second Computer Inquiry), Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 79 F.C.C.2d 953, para. 5 (1980).
122. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, paras. 12, 215-28. “There is little need
to subject carriers to the resale structure if such entities lack significant potential to crosssubsidize or to engage in other anticompetitive conduct.” Id. para. 12.
123. US West Petition, supra note 98, para. 2; BOC’s Joint Petition, supra note 87, para.
3; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced
Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 8360, paras. 3-4 (1995) [hereinafter
Computer III Remand 1995].
124. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 (2002).
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consumers. In light of the reduced incentive in the smaller markets and the
reduced resources smaller carriers might have to administer a separate
subsidiary, the relative cost of “maximum separation” did not justify the
requirement on smaller carriers.
Nevertheless, the small carriers remained in a bottleneck position in
the market as the sole supplier of the essential communications service.
They still had the incentive and opportunity to take advantage of their
monopoly control of the transmission capacity, and to act in
anticompetitive ways. In order to ensure that this bottleneck did not hinder
the enhanced services market, the Commission required that all facilitiesbased common carriers who desire to provide enhanced services must
unbundle the basic from the enhanced services. They also had to provide
the basic service to all other enhanced services on the same terms and
conditions.125 The carrier could provide the service on a bundled basis, but
had to make the unbundled offering to unaffiliated ESPs.126
Computer I never mentioned CPE because there was no thought that
the CPE would get smart enough be a part of the unregulated service. As a
result, the Commission promulgated as a part of Computer II’s unbundling
rules a prohibition against carriers bundling CPE with the provision of
telecommunications service.127 This prohibition was eliminated in 2001.128

D.

Layers

With this new conceptual framework, the Computer Inquiries, albeit
not necessarily overtly, adopted a layered model of regulation. The Layered
Model of Regulation generally divides communications policy into (1) a
physical network layer,129 (2) a logical network layer, (3) applications and
services layer, and (4) a content layer.130 These layers emanate from the
125. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 231. See, e.g., CPE Order, supra
note 92, para. 4; CPE Further Notice, supra note 97, para. 33; Frame Relay Order, supra
note 66, para. 59.
126. CPE Order, supra note 92, para. 39.
127. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(e) (2002); Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, paras. 810; see, e.g., CPE Further Notice, supra note 97, para. 2.
128. CPE Order, supra note 92, para. 1.
129. Note that physical networks include wireless networks. Although it may initially
sound confusing, the wireless spectrum is as physical as copper wires, fiber, or coaxial
cable.
130. See Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, presented at
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference (Sept. 2000), available at
http://www.edventure.com/conversation/article.cfm?counter=2414930; Robert M. Entman,
Transition to an IP Environment, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE (2001); Michael L. Katz, Thoughts
on the Implications of Technological Change for Telecommunications Policy, THE ASPEN
INSTITUTE
(2001); Douglas C. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model for
Telecommunications Policy, presented at Telecommunications Policy Research Conference
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first principal concern for markets. These differing layers demarcate natural
boundaries between markets. These market boundaries permit
communications regulation, where necessary, to be particularly
successful.131 By conceptualizing the policy as layers, the analyst is capable
of grouping and segregating issues. Issues related to the physical network
layer (i.e., common carrier regulation, spectrum policy, cable franchises)
are different from those of the logical layer (i.e., open access, peering) and
are different from those in the content layer (i.e., intellectual property,
gambling, taxation, libel). Thus, by conceptualizing the policy as layers, the
analyst is enabled to identify markets, clarify issues, create boundary
regulations that are effective, and, in so doing, target solutions where issues
reside without interfering with other industries and opportunities. The
Layered Model is a market policy mapped onto a technical conception.
The Layered Model of Regulation is not the same as the OSI (“Open
Systems Interconnection”) reference model132 or the IP stack.133 However,
it could be said the Layered Model of Regulation takes its inspiration from
and is enabled by these technical reference models. These reference models
layer different protocols which enable the provisioning of different
services. Each layer is separate from the one above and the one below. The
degree of separation is sufficiently complete so that the service provisioned
at one layer can be provisioned by one provider while the service
provisioned at another layer can be serviced by another provider.134
2002 (Sept. 1, 2002), available at http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2002/95/
TPRC_L_model.pdf; Douglas C. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model for
Telecommunications Policy (Oct. 3, 2002), available at http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/
papers/2002/95/LayeredTelecomPolicy.pdf;
COMPUTER
SCIENCE
AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BROADBAND: BRINGING
HOME THE BITS 182 (2002), available at http://www.nap.edu/html/broadband/notice.html
(calling for logical layer unbundling).
131. See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Policy-Induced Competition: The Telecommunications
Experiments, Aug. 26, 2001, at http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/~faulhabe/PolicyInduced%20Competition.pdf (to be published in INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY).
132. OSI Reference Model at
http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/
0,,sid7_gci523729,00.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2002).
133. See, e.g., DARPA Internet Program Protocol Specifications (Jon Postel ed., 1981),
RFC 791, at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0791.txt (last visited Oct. 10, 2002); Shvetima
Gulati, The Internet Protocol, Part One: The Foundations, ACM CROSSROADS STUDENT
MAGAZINE, July 2000, at http://www.acm.org/crossroads/columns/connector/july2000.html
(last visited Nov. 18, 2002).
134. Physical network services are provisioned by telephone, cable, and wireless
companies. Logical network services are provisioned by ISPs and other computer networks.
Applications may be provisioned by service providers (i.e., Web hosters, e-mail servers, or
USENET servers) or the applications may be used by the edge user on the edge user’s
computer. Content may be created by the edge user chatting in a chat room or posting Web
pages, or it might be created by an information service such as an online news service or a
streamed radio station. These are different services provisioned at different layers by
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A prime example is the Internet. The Internet protocol is designed as
a thin protocol in the middle of the layers. It is agnostic as to applications
above or physical networks below.135 By design, physical networks need
only be compatible with or optimized for IP; if IP over the physical
network is successful, then the physical network is indifferent to and need
not be optimized for any particular application or service. Conversely,
applications and services are designed to operate over IP; they are
indifferent to and need not be optimized for any particular physical
network. This creates a great deal of separation between physical networks,
logical (IP) networks, and applications and services.
The result is the robustness and flexibility of the Internet. Any
application over IP can be provisioned over any network. An edge user can,
for example, download a variety of applications to a laptop. In one moment
the laptop can be connected using a dial-up connection. In the next moment
it might be connected using a Wi-Fi wireless card. Finally, it might be
connected over a corporate local access network (“LAN”). At any moment,
the edge user is fully capable of using any application in any of these
settings (assuming sufficient bandwidth). The logical network is not
optimized for any particular application or any particular physical network.
The FCC implicitly identified that within the different layers are
different markets and different regulatory concerns:
•
The physical network (layers 1 and 2 of the OSI reference
model) is “basic services” provisioned by telephone carriers
regulated under Title II.
•
The logical network (layers 3 and 4) is TCP/IP or Internet
access provisioned by ISPs, directly and intentionally
benefiting from the Computer Inquiry safeguards.
•
Above the logical layer are services, applications, and content
provisioned by applications service providers, content
providers, and a host of other players, all generally removed
from communication regulation.
The Commission recognized that the communications facility and the
enhanced service are separate and identifiable elements of the service
provisioned to the consumer.136 “The underlying carrier’s transmission
facilities become the basic building block upon which computer facilities

different equipment and different companies.
135. This is in contrast to, for example, the telephone network which is a physical
transmission network optimized for a single application, telephony.
136. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, para. 73 (“The common carrier
transmission facility necessary for the provision of an ‘enhanced’ service becomes a
separate part of the service which must be acquired pursuant to applicable tariff . . . .”).

CANNON FINAL

Number 2]

3/5/2003 11:12 AM

COMPUTER INQUIRIES

197

can be added to perform myriad combinations and permutations of
processing activities.”137 By conceiving it as one network service layered
on top of another, the underlying layer is made into an open
communication platform available to all:
The isolation of the transmission component enables any carrier to
provide an enhanced . . . service on the same basis, without threat of
unfair competitive advantage accruing to a given carrier by virtue of its
control over the underlying transmission facilities. The transmission
facility would be common to all entities and removed as a competitive
element of the service.138

An entity, in a given moment, is either provisioning physical network
transmission capacity, or logical network Internet access services. This is a
“mutually exclusive” situation described by the Commission.139 A service
provider in a given moment is provisioning one or the other, but not both
simultaneously. For example, the SS7 switch provisions physical network
telephone services, not logical network layer Internet services. The IP
router provisions Internet access service; it does not provision physical
network transmission capacity. A provider can provide both such services,
but the services themselves remain distinct.140
This layered approach to the Computer Inquiries means clear
segregation between basic and enhanced services. Basic is never enhanced;
enhanced is never basic. The enhanced service is what is done over the
basic transmission facility; it is never the transmission facility. The basic is
always the passing of content back and forth; it is never enhanced
processing of that content. Enhanced services provisioning always means a
basic service plus an enhanced service (an enhanced service cannot exist

137. Id. para. 75.
138. Id. para. 73.
139. Stevens Report, supra note 93, para. 57. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note
25, para. 15; Computer II Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, supra note 52, para. 14 (“Under
this proposed standard it would be inconsistent to talk in terms of a communications service
having non-separable data processing functions, since communications and data processing
now would be considered mutually exclusive activities.”).
140. Stevens Report, supra note 93, para. 57 (“[W]e find strong support in the text and
legislative history of the 1996 Act for the view that Congress intended ‘telecommunications
service’ and ‘information service’ to refer to separate categories of services.”). This is true
in the broadband context as well. Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced
Telecomms. Capability, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 24011, para. 36, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1998):
An end-user may utilize a telecommunications service together with an
information service, as in the case of Internet access. In such a case, however, we
treat the two services separately: the first service is a telecommunications service
(e.g., the xDSL-enabled transmission path), and the second service is an
information service, in this case Internet access.
Id.
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without an underlying transmission service). Identifying something as an
enhanced service does not alter the underlying transmission capacity as
basic.141
This layered model approach is followed by the FCC throughout
Computer II and Computer III.

E.

Legacy of Computer II

Computer II brought a radical revision in framework. The rationale
and the policy goals, however, remained the same. As with Computer I, the
enhanced services market was viewed as dynamic, innovative, and
competitive, while the basic services were viewed as having both the
incentive and the opportunity to act anticompetitively.142
The premier legacy of Computer II is the establishment of the basic
versus enhanced dichotomy. This layered approach to regulation becomes
the bedrock of the Computer Inquiries success, and distinguishes it from
other international schemes. It established a bright-line test and amplified
the separation of the communications facility from the enhancement.
This is a “dichotomy.” These are things that are opposed to each
other. It is a competitive market as opposed to a noncompetitive market. It
is an essential service as opposed to innovation built on top. It is a physical
network as opposed to a logical network. It is a regulated service as
opposed to an unregulated service.
The dichotomy is a bottom-up analysis. First, the basic telecom
service is identified. This is the policy concern. This is the restrained
market. This is the essential service. Anything more is more. Anything
more is competitive. Anything more is not the essential service but the
innovation. Anything more is therefore unregulated.
The next significant legacy of Computer II is a cost-benefit analysis
of structural separation. This theme will lead into Computer III, resulting in
further drastic revisions to the Computer Inquiry safeguards.

141. Compare this to the Contamination Theory. See infra note 109. The underlying
transmission service even in Contamination Theory remains a basic service. Contamination
Theory merely recognizes that the supply of the transmission facility is the carrier;
regulations appropriate to the basic service are appropriate for the carrier and need not be
applied to an enhanced service provider who is taking that facility, enhancing it, and selling
it to consumers.
142. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 25, para. 125 (“The objectives of the
maximum separation policy are still valid today.”).
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Finally, Computer II continued to make clear that, while enhanced
services themselves were not regulated, they were the clearly intended
beneficiaries of the safeguards.

IV. COMPUTER III (1985)
A.

The Setting

This time the Commission managed to have four years pass without
reopening its proceeding. It is 1985. The Domain Name System had just
been introduced the previous year. The first commercial ISP had yet to be
established.143 The National Science Foundation Network (“NSFNET”)
would come online in 1986. And the Internet Engineering Task Force
(“IETF”) had not yet had its first meeting.144
In 1984, AT&T had gone through divestiture forming the BOCs.145
The BOCs for their part received official blessing from Judge Greene,
permitting them to begin to enter the enhanced services market in 1987 and
to fully enter the market in 1991.146 In 1985, the Commission launched
Computer III,147 initiating the last phase of the regulatory proceeding that
would have so many implications for the deployment of the Internet before
the commercial Internet truly broke.

B.

The Issue

The conceptual framework of the Computer Inquiries had been settled
in Computer II with the establishment of the basic versus enhanced service
dichotomy. The policy objectives remain the same. What changes is
implementation.
Driving Computer III was the perception that the separate subsidiary
requirements of Computer II “impose significant costs on the public in
decreased efficiency and innovation that substantially outweight [sic] their
143. The World’s Homepage, at http://www.theworld.com/ (last modified Nov. 1, 2002)
(established in 1989).
144. Cringely, supra note 14; Computer History Museum, supra note 14.
145. Computer III Report and Order, supra note 49, para. 24.
146. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F.Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert denied MCI Comm. Corp. v. United States, 498
U.S. 911 (1990); Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 2449, para. 29, 65 Rad. Reg.2d 1361 (P & F) (1988)
[hereinafter ONA Review]; Accounting Safeguards, supra note 48, para. 3 n.5 (“The
information services restriction was modified in 1987 to allow BOCs to provide voice
messaging services and to transmit information services generated by others. In 1991, the
restriction on BOC ownership of content-based information services was lifted.” (citations
omitted)).
147. Third Computer Inquiry, Proposed Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,581 (Aug. 20, 1985).
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benefits in limiting the ability of AT&T and the BOCS to make unfair use
of their regulated operations for the benefit of their unregulated, enhanced
services activities.”148 Believing that it could achieve appropriate
safeguards, perhaps develop a new and more progressive framework, and
also eliminate the cost of the separate subsidiary, the Commission sought to
migrate from structural safeguards to non-structural safeguards. In order to
do so, the Commission had to establish a scheme that would satisfy its
original concerns regarding anticompetitive behavior and continue to make
available an open communications platform. The Commission’s solution
was, in the short term, Comparatively Efficient Interconnection (“CEI”)
and, in the long term, Open Network Architecture (“ONA”).

C.

The Resolution

1.

Comparatively Efficient Interconnection

CEI was seen as an interim solution while BOCs create ONA plans.
Under CEI, BOCs would be permitted to enter into enhanced services
markets on a non-structurally separated basis (a separate subsidiary was no
longer needed; the ESP could be integrated into the BOC) on the condition
that they make available149 CEI plans. These CEI plans were intended to
detail what the BOC was provisioning to its affiliated ESP; BOCs would be
required to make these provisions available to all other non-affiliated ESPs
on the same terms and conditions.150
148. See Computer III Report and Order, supra note 1, para. 3. See also Computer III
Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Report and
Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 4289, para. 7, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 149 (1999) [hereinafter
Computer III Order 1999]:
In Computer III, after reexamining the telecommunications marketplace and the
effects of structural separation during the six years since Computer II, the
Commission determined that the costs of structural separation out-weighed the
benefits, and that nonstructural safeguards could protect competitive ESPs from
improper cost allocation and discrimination by the BOCs while avoiding the
inefficiencies associated with structural separation.
Id.
149. Under current rules, CEI Plans need not be submitted to the FCC but must be posted
to BOC Web sites. Id. paras. 4, 11-12; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell
Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 21628, para. 6, 18 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1344 (1999) [hereinafter Computer III Order on Reconsideration 1999].
150. A CEI plan must include information on interface functionality, unbundling of basic
services, resale, technical characteristics, installation, maintenance and repair, end-user
access, CEI availability, minimization of transport costs, and recipients of CEI. Computer
III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, para. 4, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 2017
(1998) [hereinafter Computer III Further Notice 1998]; BOC’s Joint Petition, supra note 87,
para. 3. See also Ameritech’s Comparably Efficient Interconnection Plan for Electronic
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Open Network Architecture

The next step was the move toward Open Network Architecture. This
was a radical approach to the issue. While the Commission was in retreat
on the notion and value of separate subsidiaries, ONA imposed a
progressive vision of the network. ONA required BOCs to break their
networks down into basic building blocks, and to make those building
blocks available to ESPs to build new services.151 Although not identical to
unbundled network elements,152 the BOCs would be required to break apart
the basic service offering for the benefit of the ESP market. These BOC
building blocks would be divided among Basic Service Elements (i.e.,
Calling Number Identification), Basic Serving Arrangements (fundamental
tariffed switching and transport services), Complimentary Network
Services (i.e., stutter dial tone, call waiting, call forwarding, call
forwarding on busy, hunting), and Ancillary Network Services (i.e., billing
services, collection, protocol processing).153
BOCs were required to file ONA plans regardless of whether they
entered the ESP market.154 Having successfully filed an ONA plan with the
Commission, BOCs would then be permitted to provide integrated ESP
services without filing a CEI plan.155 There was also guidance on how
ESPs could request the provision of new services.156

Vaulting Serv., Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 80, para. 16 (1997) [hereinafter Ameritech’s CEI Plan]
(“The CEI requirements are designed to give ESPs equal and efficient access to the basic
services that the BOCs use to provide their own enhanced services.”).
151. Computer III Order 1999, supra note 148, para. 8 n.17:
ONA is the overall design of a carrier’s basic network services to permit all users
of the basic network, including the information services operations of the carrier
and its competitors, to interconnect to specific basic network functions and
interfaces on an unbundled and equal-access basis. The BOCs and GTE through
ONA must unbundle key components, or elements, of their basic services and
make them available under tariff, regardless of whether their information services
operations utilize the unbundled components. Such unbundling ensures that
competitors of the carrier’s information services operations can develop
information services that utilize the carrier’s network on an economical and
efficient basis.
Id. See also Computer III Remand 1995, supra note 123, paras. 15-16.
152. See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
153. Computer III Further Notice 1998, supra note 150, para. 26. See also ONA Review,
supra note 146, para. 56.
154. Ameritech’s CEI Plan, supra note 150, para. 7, n.18. See also Bell Operating Cos.
Joint Petition for Waiver of Computer II Rules, Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 13758, para. 26, 1
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 690 (1995).
155. BOC’s Joint Petition, supra note 87, para. 3.
156. Computer III Further Notice 1998, supra note 150, paras. 81-84.
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The Computer III proceeding also set forth a set of other safeguards
that fell upon different entities: annual ONA reporting,157 network
information disclosure,158 cross-subsidization prohibitions,159 accounting
safeguards,160 and customer proprietary network information.161

3.

Litigation

Things did not go quite as planned. In California III, the Ninth Circuit
reviewed the Commission’s move from structural to non-structural
safeguards and:
found that, in granting full structural relief based on the BOC ONA
plans, the Commission had not adequately explained its apparent
“retreat” from requiring “fundamental unbundling” of BOC networks
as a component of ONA and a condition for lifting structural
separation. The court was therefore concerned that ONA unbundling,
as implemented, failed to prevent the BOCs from engaging in
discrimination against competing ESPs in providing access to basic
services.162

The Court therefore vacated and remanded the proceeding back to the FCC.
On remand, the Commission concluded that the court in California III
vacated only the Commission’s ONA rules, not the CEI rules. Therefore,
the Commission issued the Interim Waiver Order that permitted BOCs to
provide enhanced services if they complied with the CEI rules.163 In
addition, BOCs must comply with procedures set forth in the ONA plans
that they had already filed with and had been approved by the
Commission.164 The Commission also released a Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in order to resolve the issues raised in California
III.165 This rulemaking, pursuant to the remand, is still pending. In 2002,
157. Id. para. 103.
158. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(d)(2) (2001).
159. 47 U.S.C. § 254(k) (2000); 47 C.F.R. § 64.901(c) (2001).
160. 47 C.F.R. § 64 (2001).
161. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2000).
162. Computer III Further Notice 1998, supra note 150, para. 15 (footnotes omitted). See
California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1994).
163. See Computer III Further Notice 1998, supra note 150, para. 16.
164. Ameritech’s CEI Plan, supra note 150, para. 6; BOC’s Joint Petition, supra note 87,
para. 22; Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. Offer of Comparably Efficient Interconnection to Providers of
Video Dialtone-Enhanced Servs., Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 985, para. 4 (1995); Computer III
Remand 1995, supra note 123, paras. 9-12.
165. Computer III Remand 1995, supra note 123; see also Computer III Further Notice
1998, supra note 150; Computer III Order 1999, supra note 148, para. 4 (eliminating the
requirement that BOCs receive approval of CEI plans from FCC; and permitting BOCs to
simply post plans on Web sites and provide notice to FCC); Computer III Order on
Reconsideration 1999, supra note 149, para. 4 (denying CIX’s petition for reconsideration).
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the Commission released the Broadband Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
which subsumed the Computer III proceeding and is currently pending.166
In sum, currently under Computer III, CEI is an ongoing obligation
where BOCs choose to provide enhanced services and the ONA plans that
were filed remain binding.

4.

Enforcement

The Commercial Internet eXchange (“CIX”) objected to the
movement to non-structural safeguards, arguing that this created a problem
with enforcement. Recognizing validity to the CIX objection, the
Commission stated:
We believe that competitive ISPs will themselves monitor CEI
compliance vigilantly, and will call the Commission’s attention to any
failure by a BOC to follow through on its CEI responsibilities. . . . The
Commission will not hesitate to use its enforcement authority,
including the Accelerated Docket or revised complaint procedures, to
review and adjudicate allegations that a BOC is falling short of
fulfilling any of its CEI obligations.167

Note, however, that this does create certain structural oddities. First,
an unregulated industry, with little knowledge of the FCC, is asked to
watch a regulated industry. Second, small companies are asked to watch the
largest corporations in the United States. Third, ISPs are placed in a
position of filing complaints against their sole supplier of a crucial facility.
Fourth, contrary to normal jurisprudence, the party that lacks the
information has the burden of moving (normally, all things being equal, the
party with the information has the burden of moving—in this case, the
burden is on the ISPs, because the information is held by the BOCs).

D.

Legacy of Computer III

The legacy of Computer III was first and foremost an affirmation of
the policy goals set forth in Computer I and Computer II. Computer III
does not alter the fundamental philosophy of the Computer Inquiries.
Concern for anticompetitive behavior and maintaining an open
communications platform is retained. Likewise, the conceptual framework
of the basic versus enhanced dichotomy that tracks the technical layers of
the network is affirmed.
Computer III alters implementation by initiating new, novel, and even
progressive experiments in opening up the communications bottleneck for

166. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019 (2002).
167. Computer III Order 1999, supra note 148, para. 15.
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the benefit of enhanced services. This marks a migration away from
structural safeguards. It also signifies renewed emphasis on opening up the
facilities network for the benefit of the enhanced service or computer
network operating on top of the physical network. It affirms that while
enhanced services remain unregulated, the Computer Inquiry policy is
designed for the direct benefit of those enhanced services.
The transition from Computer I to Computer II marked a radical
evolution of the conceptual framework, with implementation remaining
fundamentally the same. The transition from Computer II to Computer III
marked a radical evolution in the implementation, with the conceptual
framework remaining the same.

V. CONCLUSION
The Computer III Final Order was released in 1986. The first
commercial ISP was established in 1989. The Commercial Internet
eXchange was set up in 1991 as the first exchange point for traffic between
commercial Internet backbones (such traffic was not permitted on the
NSFNET). The World Wide Web was unleashed in 1991. The White
House came online in 1993 and Congress was placed online in 1994. The
mid-1990s saw the explosive growth of Internet users.168 In 1998,
Boardwatch magazine reported, at its peak, that there were more than 7,000
ISPs in North America.169
Was the success of the Internet attributable to the actions of the
Commission? Did the Commission “invent the Internet?” The success of
the Internet was clearly the result of the confluence of forces. For the
Commission’s part, it had established the policy of the Computer Inquiries,
deregulated the Customer Premise Equipment market (i.e., modems), and
promoted ubiquitous and affordable flat-rate telephone lines (i.e., universal
service).170 All of these were necessary precursors to the success of the
Internet.
There is also little new under the sun. The problem that the
168. Cringeley, supra note 14; Computer History Museum, supra note 14.
169. Bill McCarthy, Introduction to BOARDWATCH MAGAZINE’S DIRECTORY OF INTERNET
SERVICE PROVIDERS 4 (12th ed., Penton Media 2000).
170. Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy,
Office of Plans and Policy, FCC, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/
oppwp29pdf.html (1997); Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining the Future in
Terms of the Past, Office of Plans and Policy, FCC, at http://www.fcc.
gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp30.pdf (1998); Jason Oxman, The FCC and the
Unregulation of the Internet, Office of Plans and Policy, Federal Communications
Commission, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf (1999).
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Commission described itself as facing in 1966 was “convergence.” The
problems were ones of substitutability, asymmetric regulation between
functionally equivalent services, the restricted supply of communications
services to a highly competitive enhanced services market, and the desire
of the communications services dominant players who wanted to enter the
highly competitive enhanced services market. The Commission faces
similar issues today.
There is a tendency of regulators to automatically impose legacy
regulation on new services that appear similar to, substitutes of, or threats
to traditional services. The policymaker must always ask why. Why impose
legacy regulation on the new service? By framing the question properly,
the policymaker can gain better answers. By framing the question in terms
of the layered model, that is, in terms of identifiable markets within
communications industries, it helps avoid a mushed view of
communications where the difference between applications and the
physical network cannot be perceived. If, for example, telephony is
uncoupled from the physical network and the old monopoly market, and is
now provisioned in the highly competitive applications market, what
implications does that have for policy?
The Computer Inquiries have been wildly successful. They followed a
layered model of regulation and sought to constrain anticompetitive
behavior where it occurred. The potential bottleneck in the physical
network layer was identified; the competitive market and potential for
growth and innovation for enhanced services was identified. A policy was
created which promoted economic and technological expansion.171 In so
doing, the Commission avoided imposing legacy common carrier
regulation on new services. It created open communications platforms
where innovation could occur, independent of dominant communications
players.

171. In 1996, Congress declared that “[i]t is the policy of the United States—(1) to
promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services
and other interactive media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2) (2000).
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